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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Almost two decades ago, this Court declared that “[a]n 
appeal is not just the procedural next step in every lawsuit,” 
and the decision to challenge “an order of the District Court is 
not a matter to be taken lightly.” Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 
108 (3d Cir. 2004). Today we reemphasize these truths. In this 




Gilsenan filed a brief that was essentially a copy of the one he 
filed in the District Court. Because the substance of this appeal 
is as frivolous as its form, we will affirm the District Court’s 
summary judgment and grant Appellee CBE Group’s motion 
for damages under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  
I 
 The case arises out of an unpaid debt. Appellants 
Conboy and Gilsenan, with help from a $594,000 loan from the 
United States Small Business Administration, bought and 
renovated a commercial property in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 
that became Ceoltas Irish Pub. Conboy and Gilsenan executed 
a note, mortgage, and unconditional guarantees that they would 
repay the loan. The guarantees provided that federal law would 
control the enforcement of the note and guarantees and that 
Conboy and Gilsenan may not invoke any state or local law to 
deny their obligation to the SBA.  
 Conboy and Gilsenan defaulted on the loan and sold the 
property. The SBA allowed the sale to proceed but declined to 
release Appellants from their loan obligations.  
After repeated attempts to collect the debt failed, the 
SBA assigned the debt to CBE Group for collection. Rather 
than pay the debt, Conboy and Gilsenan sued the SBA, the 
United States Treasury Department, First National Bank, Seda 
Cog (an agency that facilitated the original loan transaction), 
and CBE in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, 
Pennsylvania. The SBA removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The 
Treasury Department and First National Bank were dismissed 




In an amended complaint, Conboy and Gilsenan alleged 
federal claims for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq. They also 
alleged state law claims for violating the Pennsylvania Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 201-1, et seq., breach of contract, unjust 
enrichment, and defamation.  
After discovery, Defendants moved for summary 
judgment, and CBE sought sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. CBE argued that Conboy 
and Gilsenan brought frivolous claims and disobeyed 
discovery orders. Conboy and Gilsenan filed an untimely brief 
opposing both sanctions and summary judgment, which did not 
include the separate responsive statement of material facts 
required by Local Rule 56.1. Under the Local Rule, that failure 
to provide a responsive statement conceded the material facts 
set forth in the moving parties’ statements.  
The District Court granted summary judgment and 
denied the sanctions motions. It held, among other things: (1) 
that the FDCPA and UTPCPL claims failed because neither 
statute applies to commercial debts; (2) Conboy and Gilsenan 
identified no material facts in the record supporting their 
claims against Seda Cog, their unjust enrichment claim against 
CBE, or their FCRA claim against the SBA; (3) the contract 
claim against the SBA failed because Conboy and Gilsenan 
“admitted”—by not filing a counterstatement of material 
facts—that the unconditional loan guarantees foreclosed 
bringing a state law claim to deny their loan obligations; (4) 
they admitted they had no contract with CBE; and (5) 
sovereign immunity barred the unjust enrichment and 




held that “no extraordinary circumstances” justified Rule 11 
sanctions, and that Rule 37 sanctions were unnecessary 
because Conboy and Gilsenan’s conduct during discovery did 
not “significantly prejudice[] CBE.” Conboy v. U.S. Small Bus. 
Admin., 2020 WL 1244352, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020). 
Conboy and Gilsenan appealed the summary judgment. 
II1 
 Conboy and Gilsenan’s opening brief begins with a 
proper introductory sentence arguing that the District Court 
should not have granted summary judgment. Opening Br. at 1. 
But it quickly goes awry in the next paragraph: “The district 
court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case . . . .” Id. 
One could readily assume that the sentence included a 
typographical error, using “has” instead of “had.” But just two 
sentences later, the brief declares: “Venue is appropriately laid 
in the District Court of New Jersey . . . .” Id. This second use 
of the present tense, denoting the wrong trial court, presages 
what comes after, which belies the notion of an honest mistake.  
 In the first sentence of his legal argument, counsel 
describes the summary judgment standard. Id. at 6. Two pages 
later, he argues that “summary judgment should be denied 
. . . .” Id. at 8. In the next section of his argument, counsel again 
writes as if the case remains in the District Court, claiming 
“there is no reason to grant summary judgment based on 
jurisdictional reasons for either party.” Id. at 13. Apart from 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1367, and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s summary 
judgment de novo. Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 




these unusual (and inappropriate) references to the case 
pending in the District Court, counsel’s fifteen pages of 
“argument” do not mention how the District Court erred. This 
left us with the suspicion that something was amiss with 
counsel’s brief.   
Unfortunately, our suspicions were confirmed. Counsel 
for Conboy and Gilsenan simply took the summary judgment 
section of his District Court brief and copied and pasted it into 
his appellate brief, with minor changes such as swapping 
“Defendant” for “Appellee.” Compare Appendix A hereto, 
with Appendix B. This is not proper appellate advocacy.  
Unsurprisingly, the lack of appellate argument reflects 
the correctness of the District Court’s summary judgment. The 
Court properly granted judgment on the UTPCPL and FDCPA 
claims because those statutes apply to consumer debts, not 
commercial ones like the debt at issue. In re Smith, 866 F.2d 
576, 583 (3d Cir. 1989) (73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201-9.2, the 
UTPCPL section on private actions, applies “only [to] those 
persons who purchase or lease goods or services primarily for 
consumer use rather than for commercial use”); Staub v. 
Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1980) (the FDCPA “was 
intended to apply only to debts contracted by consumers for 
personal, family or household purposes” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Conboy and Gilsenan did not 
identify evidence supporting their claims against Seda Cog, 
their unjust enrichment claim against CBE, or their FCRA 
claim against the SBA. Nor did they point to evidence of any 
contract with CBE. In addition, the unconditional loan 
guarantees preempted the contract claim against the SBA, and 
the defamation claim against the SBA failed because of 
sovereign immunity. See Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 376, 




States are prohibited.”). Finally, although we have not 
explicitly addressed whether the United States has waived 
sovereign immunity as to unjust enrichment claims, we need 
not resolve that issue here because Conboy and Gilsenan cited 
no record evidence creating a factual dispute material to their 
unjust enrichment claim against the SBA. See Kabakjian v. 
United States, 267 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We may 
affirm a judgment on any ground apparent from the record.”). 
Regrettably, counsel’s response to CBE’s motion for 
damages under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure is yet another copy-and-paste job. Counsel copied 
Conboy and Gilsenan’s previous opposition to sanctions in the 
District Court under Civil Rules 11 and 37—with only 
insignificant alterations and additions. Compare Appendix C 
hereto, with Appendix A at 10–12. Contrary to counsel’s 
assertion, the Rule 38 motion did not duplicate the sanctions 
motions, and we will grant it even though the District Court’s 
denial of sanctions was well within its discretion.  
 Rule 38 authorizes compensatory damages—not 
sanctions or punishment—to reimburse appellees who must 
defend judgments against frivolous appeals, “and to preserve 
the appellate court calendar for cases worthy of consideration.” 
Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Huck v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 52 (3d Cir. 1997)); Beam, 383 
F.3d at 108. We “employ[] an objective standard to determine 
whether or not an appeal is frivolous” on the merits, without 
considering appellants’ “good or bad faith.” Kerchner, 612 
F.3d at 209 (quoting Hilmon Co. (V.I.) v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 
250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Here, despite many cues from . . . 
the District Court that [their] cause was wholly meritless,” see 
Beam, 383 F.3d at 109, Conboy and Gilsenan’s counsel filed a 




District Court did wrong. It is hard to imagine a clearer case 
for Rule 38 damages.  
 We may impose these damages on clients, but here we 
will place responsibility for payment on the lawyer. See id. 
“[A]ttorneys have an affirmative obligation to research the law 
and to determine if a claim on appeal is utterly without merit 
and may be deemed frivolous.” Hilmon, 899 F.2d at 254. 
“[B]ecause it would be unfair to charge a damage award 
against [parties who have] relied upon [their] counsel’s 
expertise in deciding whether to appeal, we have routinely 
imposed Rule 38 damages upon counsel when a frivolous 
appeal stems from counsel’s professional error.” Beam, 383 
F.3d at 109. In this case, Conboy and Gilsenan’s attorney is to 
blame for recycling meritless arguments without engaging the 
District Court’s analysis. 
* * * 
It’s not easy to become a lawyer. The practice of law is 
challenging, and even the best lawyers make mistakes from 
time to time. So we err on the side of leniency toward the bar 
in close cases. But the copy-and-paste jobs before us reflect a 
dereliction of duty, not an honest mistake. We will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s summary judgment and grant CBE’s 
motion for Rule 38 sanctions after counsel for CBE files an 
appropriate fee petition and counsel for Appellants has a 
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PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS U.S. SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION’S, CBE GROUP AND SEDA COG MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND SANCTIONS  
 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
  Plaintiffs sold the property, known as 310 North Second Street, Harrisburg PA 18360 by 
on February 17, 2016. (See Exhibit A – HUD1)1. As part of that sale, there were two loans paid 
off to First National Bank S/B/M Metro Bank, the first mortgage of $432,113.49 and the second 
mortgage for $45,340.43. Defendant SBA was responsible for backing the second mortgage that 
was paid off the $45,340.43. Defendant SBA signed off and agreed to permit this sale to take 
place.  As such, there was an alleged deficiency to the SBA of $276,315.61. This information 
was, in fact, sent for the first time to Plaintiffs on September 3, 2016, which was 6 months and 
18 days after the sale. (See Exhibit B). This was beyond the 6 month cutoff for a deficiency 
judgment on a mortgage to be pursued. After that time, Defendant SBA transferred the debt 
 
1 All exhibits incorporated by reference from prior pleading and complaint for sake of brevity.  
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improperly to Defendant CBE Group. As of October 19, 2017, Defendant CBE has not only 
made many collection attempts in writing, but added on interested and fees so the current debt 
balance is now allegedly at $374,258.64. (see Exhibit C). At no time was a lawsuit brought or a 
judgment received during the 6 month period after the sale of the property took place. Defendant 
CBE has been informed that their collection efforts are not legal, yet they have continued to 
pursue those efforts despite this knowledge. Further, on or around February 9, 2018, Defendant 
SBA reported an outstanding balance to the Credit Bureaus for Mr. Conboy. This report stated 
that the account was allegedly opened on April 15, 2005, the “high balance” was for $594,000, 
there was a balance of 271,799 and the last time Mr. Conboy allegedly made a payment was 
October 11, 2017. Further, it had a status of “charged off”. This report was done solely to 
damage Mr. Conboy’s credit and in retaliation for the filing of this suit, as there had never been a 
report previously. There was no reasonable or legal reason for this report, and it was done for 
completely improper purposes, with the express intent to damage Mr. Conboy, his ability to 
receive credit and to defame him for anyone else who would potentially attempt to lend him 
money and see such a derogatory report. 
  Further, there is no question that Seda Cog had an interest in this matter. (See Exhibit D – 
modification). Additionally, they were communicating with Plaintiff as late as 2015. Some of the 
people who communicated with Plaintiff from Seda Cog were X and B. There is no question 
they still had an interest in this matter and were actively attempting to collect on this debt. As 
such, they belong as a party to this matter as well.   
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. BOTH DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FAIL  TO SHOW THEY ARE ENTITLED 
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
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Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no 
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A 
fact is only “material” for purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that fact 
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. A dispute about a 
material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party.” Id. The dispute is not genuine if it merely involves “some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
586 (1986).  
The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to 
admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its 
burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Once the moving party 
meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant who must set forth specific facts 
showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations, speculations, 
unsupported assertions or denials of its pleadings. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d 
Cir. 2001). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make 
credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving 
party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” 
Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
255). Furthermore, in deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's 
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role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 
In this case, summary judgment should be denied because Defendants not only rely on 
insufficient evidence, but outdated case law, inapplicable arguments and their evidence is so 
contradictory, that Defendants essentially defeat themselves with their own evidence. To further 
these proofs though, Defendants now present their own evidence as well, to show substantial 
material facts now in issue. 
As stated in the relatively recent case, Tepper v Amos, No. 17-2851 3rd Cir., Aug. 7, 2018, The 
Court discussed the “default” test and ultimately choose to say that, based on the Supreme court 
case of Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017), it would no longer 
apply. Instead, the court chose to follow the plain text of the statute: “an entity whose principal 
purpose of business is the collection of any debts is a debt collector regardless whether the entity 
owns the debts it collects. Id. 
 Further, the FDCPA is a “remedial legislation” aimed, as already noted, “to eliminate 
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 
168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting § 1692(e); Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 
709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013)). Importantly, it applies only to “debt collectors,” Pollice v. 
Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3d Cir. 2000), defined as any person: (1) “who uses 
any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of 
which is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” definition); or (2) “who regularly 
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or 
due another” (the “regularly collects for another,” or “regularly collects,” definition).1 § 
1692a(6). Further, and most importantly, “The FDCPA is a strict liability statute to the extent 
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that it imposes liability without proof of an intentional violation.” Allen ex. rel, Martin v. 
LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011).  
As stated previously, the Supreme Court, in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017), has recently repealed the “default” test. Debtors claimed that Santander 
Bank, which had purchased their loans already in default and attempted to collect on them, met 
the second definition of “debt collector,” i.e., one who “regularly collects or attempts to collect . . 
. debts owed or due . . . another.” Id. at 1721 (quoting § 1692a(6)). They asserted as well that the 
Bank met the “principal purpose” definition, but the Court did not review that claim because it 
was not litigated in the District Court. Id. The Supreme Court began “with a careful examination 
of the statutory text,” in particular the definition’s limitation to debts “owed . . . another.” Id. It 
reasoned that “by its plain terms this language seems to focus our attention on third party 
collection agents working for a debt owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for 
itself.” Id. This language does not suggest that “whether the owner originated the debt or came 
by it only through later purchase” determines if it is a debt collector. Id. “All that matters is 
whether the target of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect debts for its own account or does so 
for ‘another.’” Id. Hence the Bank, which collected debts for its own account, did not meet the 
“regularly collects for another” definition. Id. at 1721–22. The Court also addressed the 
suggestion that everyone who attempts to collect debt is either a “debt collector” or a “creditor” 
with respect to a particular debt, but cannot be both. Id. “[S]potting (without granting) th[at] 
premise,” it stated that a company such as the Bank, which collects on debt it purchased for its 
own account, “would hardly seem to be barred from qualifying as a creditor under the statute’s 
plain terms.” Id. But excluded from the definition of “creditor” are those who acquire a debt after 
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default when the debt is assigned or transferred “solely for the purpose of facilitating collection 
of such debt for another.” Id. (quoting § 1692a(4)). 
 
II. DEFENDANT SBA’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE 
DENIED 
 
 This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action 
arises in part out of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et. seq. and Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. See Alfaro V. Wells Fargo N.A., 
d/b/a America's Servicing Company, Civil Action No. 16-7950 (DNJ 2017). While it is accurate 
that these are not the only claims, they are the Federal claims in this matter and, it is bad faith for 
Defendant to only remove the action and the turn around and claim the court lacks jurisdiction 
and also to move for summary judgment on similar grounds. See Generally Rivas v. Bowling 
Green Associates, L.P. No. 13-cv-7812, , at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014)). As such, for 
Defendant to remove to Federal Court, for the sole purpose of attempting dismissal or procuring 
improper summary judgment, would be tantamount to bad faith. Further, there is no question that 
this court can hear the related state claims as well based on Supplemental jurisdiction. 
Supplemental jurisdiction is the authority of United States federal courts to hear additional 
claims substantially related to the original claim even though the court would lack the subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear the additional claims independently. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As such, there 
is no reason to grant summary judgment based on jurisdictional reasons for either party.  
 As stated by Defendant, it is axiomatic that the United States and its agencies and officers 
are immune from suit unless they have consented to be sued. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 
(1994); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). In re Epps, 110 B.R. 691 (E.D. Pa. 
1990) (sovereign immunity waived under National Housing Act authorizing HUD to "sue and be 
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sued" in carrying out certain provisions of the Act). Such "sue and be sued" statutes waive 
sovereign immunity only of particular agencies, not the United States generally. See Lomas & 
Nettleton Co. v. Pierce, 636 F.2d 971, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1981); Indus. Indem., Inc. v. Landrieu, 
615 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1980). If the judgment sought by the plaintiff would "expend itself 
on the public Treasury," the suit is in reality against the United States regardless of whether the 
complaint names only Federal agencies or officials. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) 
(quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947)); see also FHA V. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 250-51 
(1940) (garnishment action against Federal agency permitted only to the extent it had funds 
outside the Treasury); Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States ex rel. Sec'y of HUD, 175 
F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1999) (waiver of HUD's immunity limited to funds under control of HUD, 
does not reach general Treasury funds). Finally, in the case of "sue-and-be-sued" agencies, one 
can argue that, although such governmental units may have independent litigating authority, the 
Bankruptcy Code, § 106, places limits upon the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts over any 
governmental unit. Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1047 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 
(although HUD might be suable in other courts upon certain causes of action, Tucker Act places 
limits upon Court of Claims' jurisdiction over them).  
 In this case, by transferring the interest in the underlying debt for the sole purpose of 
attempting to collect on that debt, that was an affirmative action that effectively waived 
sovereign immunity. Even though it is admitted that the SBA transferred the debt, they were still 
responsible for the apparent “deficiency” and the initiation of the transfer. As such, even the 
SBA was not the primary party to begin the debt collection process, it was still their actions that 
permitted it to proceed. As such, they can be sued for their actions that left to the collection 
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action, even if they were not directly the party doing so. Specifically, the SBA can be held 
accountable for their actions  under the FCRA.  
 In Kent v. TransUnion, plaintiff Rowdy Kent sued multiple consumer reporting agencies 
and the United States Defense Finance and Accounting Services for alleged violations of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act. See Kent v. Trans Union, LLC, docket number 16-322 (2017) DFAS 
moved to dismiss Kent’s claims, arguing that it possesses sovereign immunity from claims under 
the FCRA. On August 25, 2017 the District Court for the Northern District of Texas rejected 
DFAS’s contention, finding that Congress had waived sovereign immunity for claims under the 
FCRA. As such, because the actions taken by the SBA led to damage to Plaintiff Conboy’s 
credit, that is enough to keep them in the case for the FCRA violation and related stated claims 
as well as not granting summary judgment.  
 Further, there is a relevant exception to the sovereign immunity waiver. If the plaintiff 
seeks less than $10,000 in damages, the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with 
the United States Court of Federal Claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346, also known as the “Little 
Tucker Act”. The current version gives concurrent jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims 
and the District Courts "for the recovery of  … any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any 
manner wrongfully collected … and for claims below $10,000" See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).  For 
this case, Plaintiffs are willing to limit their claim against the SBA to below $10,000.00 for the 
damage they caused through the transfer they effectuated as well as the damage to credit, 
particularly if the SBA agrees to repair said damage. As such, even if the FDCPA cannot be 
brought against Defendant SBA, it can still proceed against the other Defendants and as such, 
summary judgment should be granted to the claim fully. As such, the SBA essentially admitted 
and agreed that the other claims, as long as they are each limited to $10,000.00 can proceed. The 
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only other “argument” is a failure to exhaust “administrative remedies” but in none of the 
pleadings is it stated what remedies should have been pursued before filing this suit. As such, 
this argument should be considered a red herring at most, and can be denied.  
III. DEFENDANT SED COGA AND CBE GROUP’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT  MUST BE DENIED 
Seda Cog and CBE Group rely primarily on the assertion they “transferred their rights 
away” in 2006. This simply is not accurate, as a modification was signed with them in 2013 (see 
Exhibit D) and they were contacting Plaintiff as late as 2015. As such, their implicit statute of 
limitations argument against the claims against them must be denied.   
Several of the above arguments can be applied to Seda Cog as well and are incorporated 
by reference. As in the Alfaro case, the Plaintiffs are “not inviting the district court to review and 
reject any state judgment under this cause of action.” Alfaro V. Wells Fargo N.A., d/b/a 
America's Servicing Company, Civil Action No. 16-7950 (DNJ 2017). The reason for this is 
because the actionable offenses that the statute would have applied occurred, as Defendants 
admitted well within the two years statute. The actions that occurred by Defendant previously 
clearly show the scheme at issue here. Even though they try to claim they had no interest since 
2006, that is simply not accurate. As such, they must remain as Defendants in this action for all 
of the damages caused to Plaintiffs, 
As to the breach of contract, unjust enrichment and the other state claims, the statute that 
applies is the a four year statute, rather than a two year statue, as per either 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 
5525(7), (8); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5529 for written contracts or  42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5525(3) 
for oral contracts. These relate to the modification that was offered and which payments were 
made on it.  
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Additionally, there should be no question that Defendant Seda Cog can be considered a 
Debt Collector. Defendant squarely falls into the definition of a “debt collector” because they 
certainly qualify as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the 
mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who 
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 
owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). Further, a party is also a “debt collector” if the 
obligation is already in default when it is assigned. Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 
793 F.3d 355, 358, fn. 2 (3d Cir. 2015). In this case, by either standard, Defendant would be 
considered a debt collector, as through their actions there is now an attempt to collect the 
underlying debt in question. Finally whether or not a party was a “debt collector” is a material 
fact for a fact finder to decide. A mere allegation a part was not is insufficient and since 
Defendants attached no actual evidence to this matter, the argument should be deemed moot. 
 
IV. THE MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS SHOULD BE DENIED 
Defendants’ motions utterly lacks merit and was filed for an improper purpose, and its 
denial should be compounded by a corresponding levy of sanctions and costs against Defendants. 
Defendants have used both the threat and the filing of the motion, not as a means to filter a 
frivolous claim but as a bullying tactic intended to intimidate Plaintiffs into withdrawing 
legitimate claims This misuse of Rule 11 is in and of itself sanctionable. Indeed, the Advisory 
Committee notes point out that Rule 11 should not be used “to emphasize the merits of a party’s 
position, to exact an unjust settlement, [or] to intimidate an adversary into withdrawing 
contentions that are fairly debatable.” See Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust 
Fund v. B.R. Starnes Co. of Florida, 827 F.2d 1454, 1458 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial 
Case 3:18-cv-00224-MEM   Document 55   Filed 11/10/19   Page 10 of 12
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of sanctions where the issues were fairly debatable and not easily resolved, and there was no 
clear binding precedent).  
The standard under Rule 11 is “stringent” because sanctions “1) are in derogation of the general 
American policy of encouraging resort to the courts for peaceful resolution of disputes, 2) tend to 
spawn satellite litigation counter-productive to efficient disposition of cases, and 3) increase 
tensions among the litigating bar and between [the] bench and [the] bar.” Doering v. Union Cty. 
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988). While the focus of Rule 11 is on 
whether a claim is wholly without merit, and is not dictated by whether resources will be 
expended in deciding the motion, Rule 11 motions should conserve rather than misuse judicial 
resources. See Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Rather than 
misusing scarce resources, [the] timely filing and disposition of Rule 11 motions should conserve 
judicial energies.”). 
Defendants’ motions fail not only for its lack of merit, but it also violates the ethical 
underpinnings of Rule 11. Rule 11 imposes a duty on the party seeking sanctions to be 
circumspect in pursuing such a drastic remedy and to not to use the device for an improper 
purpose lest it may discourage expansion of the law through creative legal theories. See Ario v. 
Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) (Rule 11 
“should not be applied to adventuresome, though responsible, lawyering which advocates 
creative legal theories.”)(citations omitted). Sanctions are a drastic remedy reserved for only the 
most extraordinary circumstances. See, Park v. Seoul Broad. Sys. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17277, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2008). Whether a claim can survive on the merits is wholly 
distinct from whether that claim is frivolous. See Abdelhamid v. Altria Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 
2d 384, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)(“‘When divining the point at which an argument turns from merely 
Case 3:18-cv-00224-MEM   Document 55   Filed 11/10/19   Page 11 of 12
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 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny 
Defendants’ motions in full.  
 
      _/s/ Joshua Thomas, Esq._ 
      Joshua Thomas, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
Dated: September 30, 2019 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary issue at the heart of this case is, 
that summary judgment was improperly granted, and the 
parties should have been permitted to have this heard 
on the merits, as it should have been. 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The district court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This Court has 
supplemental jurisdiction over Appellees and the 
state law based claims pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 
1367. Venue is appropriately laid in the District 
Court of New Jersey pursuant to 28 USC §1391(b)(2) as 
the events giving rise to the claim occurred 
substantially within the State of New Jersey. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S. 
Code § 1291 (Final decisions of district courts). 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.Whether Appellees’ Motions Failed To Show They Were
Entitled To Summary Judgment?

3 
$276,315.61. This information was, in fact, sent for the 
first time to Appellants on September 3, 2016, which was 
6 months and 18 days after the sale. (See APPENDIX A1).
This was beyond the 6 month cutoff for a deficiency 
judgment on a mortgage to be pursued. After that time, 
Appellee SBA transferred the debt improperly to Appellee
CBE Group. As of October 19, 2017, Appellee CBE has not 
only made many collection attempts in writing, but added 
on interested and fees so the current debt balance is 
now allegedly at $374,258.64. (see APPENDIX A1). At no 
time was a lawsuit brought or a judgment received during 
the 6 month period after the sale of the property took 
place. CBE has been informed that their 
collection efforts are not legal, yet they have 
continued to pursue those efforts despite this 
knowledge. Further, on or around February 9, 2018, 
Credit Bureaus for Mr. Conboy. This report stated that 
the account was allegedly opened on April 15, 2005, the 
“high balance” was for $594,000, there was a balance of 
Appellee
Appellee SBA reported an outstanding balance to the 
4 
271,799 and the last time Mr. Conboy allegedly made a 
payment was October 11, 2017. Further, it had a status 
of “charged off”. This report was done solely to damage 
Mr. Conboy’s credit and in retaliation for the filing 
of this suit, as there had never been a report 
previously. There was no reasonable or legal reason for 
this report, and it was done for completely improper 
purposes, with the express intent to damage Mr. Conboy, 
his ability to receive credit and to defame him for 
anyone else who would potentially attempt to lend him 
money and see such a derogatory report. 
Further, there is no question that Seda Cog had an 
interest in this matter. (See A1 – 
modification). Additionally, they were communicating 
with Appellant as late as 2015. Some of the people who 
communicated with Appellant from Seda Cog were X and B. 
There is no question they still had an interest in this 
matter and were actively attempting to collect on this 




VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s 
ruling on an order to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526, 
530-31 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007) ). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
555, and a complaint must plead specific facts that 
raise “more than a sheer possibility that a Appellee 
has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court 
need not, and may not, accept legal conclusions 
packaged as factual allegations. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.

7 
The moving party must show that if the evidentiary 
material of record were reduced to admissible evidence 
in court, it would be insufficient to permit the 
nonmoving party to carry its burden of proof. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Once the 
moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then 
shifts to the nonmovant who must set forth specific facts 
showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon 
the mere allegations, speculations, unsupported 
assertions or denials of its pleadings. Shields v. 
Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001). “In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, a district 
court may not make credibility determinations or engage 
in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving 
party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v. 
Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Furthermore, in 
deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary 
judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the 

9 
debt collector regardless whether the entity owns the 
debts it collects. Id.
Further, the FDCPA is a “remedial legislation” 
aimed, as already noted, “to eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices by debt collectors.” Kaymark v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting § 1692(e); Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue 
Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
Importantly, it applies only to “debt collectors,” 
Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 
(3d Cir. 2000), defined as any person: (1) “who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in 
any business the principal purpose of which is the 
collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” 
definition); or (2) “who regularly collects or attempts 
to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due 
or asserted to be owed or due another” (the “regularly 
collects for another,” or “regularly collects,” 
definition).1 § 1692a(6). Further, and most importantly, 
“The FDCPA is a strict liability statute to the extent 
10 
that it imposes liability without proof of an 
intentional violation.” Allen ex. rel, Martin v. LaSalle 
Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011). 
As stated previously, the Supreme Court, in Henson 
v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017),
has recently repealed the “default” test. Debtors 
claimed that Santander Bank, which had purchased their 
loans already in default and attempted to collect on 
them, met the second definition of “debt collector,” 
i.e., one who “regularly collects or attempts to collect
. . . debts owed or due . . . another.” Id. at 1721 
(quoting § 1692a(6)). They asserted as well that the 
Bank met the “principal purpose” definition, but the 
Court did not review that claim because it was not 
litigated in the District Court. Id. The Supreme Court 
began “with a careful examination of the statutory 
text,” in particular the definition’s limitation to 
debts “owed . . . another.” Id. It reasoned that “by its 
plain terms this language seems to focus our attention 
on third party collection agents working for a debt 
11 
owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for 
itself.” Id. This language does not suggest that 
“whether the owner originated the debt or came by it 
only through later purchase” determines if it is a debt 
collector. Id. “All that matters is whether the target 
of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect debts for its 
own account or does so for ‘another.’” Id. Hence the 
Bank, which collected debts for its own account, did not 
meet the “regularly collects for another” definition. 
Id. at 1721–22. The Court also addressed the suggestion 
that everyone who attempts to collect debt is either a 
“debt collector” or a “creditor” with respect to a 
particular debt, but cannot be both. Id. “[S]potting 
(without granting) th[at] premise,” it stated that a 
company such as the Bank, which collects on debt it 
purchased for its own account, “would hardly seem to be 
barred from qualifying as a creditor under the statute’s 
plain terms.” Id. But excluded from the definition of 
“creditor” are those who acquire a debt after default 
when the debt is assigned or transferred “solely for the 

13 
be tantamount to bad faith. Further, there is no question 
that this court can hear the related state claims as 
well based on Supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental
jurisdiction is the authority of United States federal 
courts to hear additional claims substantially related 
to the original claim even though the court would lack 
the subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the additional 
claims independently. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As such, there 
is no reason to grant summary judgment based on 
jurisdictional reasons for either party. 
As stated by Appellee, it is axiomatic that the 
United States and its agencies and officers are immune 
from suit unless they have consented to be sued. FDIC
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475
(1994); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 
(1980). In re Epps, 110 B.R. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
(sovereign immunity waived under National Housing Act 
authorizing HUD to "sue and be sued" in carrying out 
certain provisions of the Act). Such "sue and be sued" 
statutes waive sovereign immunity only of particular 
14 
agencies, not the United States generally. See Lomas & 
Nettleton Co. v. Pierce, 636 F.2d 971, 972-73 (5th Cir. 
1981); Indus. Indem., Inc. v. Landrieu, 615 F.2d 644, 
(1940) (garnishment action against Federal agency 
permitted only to the extent it had funds outside the 
Treasury); Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States 
ex rel. Sec'y of HUD, 175 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(waiver of HUD's immunity limited to funds under control 
of HUD, does not reach general Treasury funds). Finally, 
in the case of "sue-and-be-sued" agencies, one can argue 
that, although such governmental units may have 
independent litigating authority, the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 106, places limits upon the jurisdiction of the
646 (5th Cir. 1980). If the judgment sought by the 
Appellant would "expend itself on the public Treasury," 
the suit is in reality against the United States 
regardless of whether the complaint names only Federal 
agencies or officials. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 
(1963) (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 
(1947)); see also FHA V. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 250-51 
15 
bankruptcy courts over any governmental unit. Cf. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1047 (Ct. Cl. 
1981) (although HUD might be suable in other courts upon 
certain causes of action, Tucker Act places limits upon 
Court of Claims' jurisdiction over them). 
In this case, by transferring the interest in the 
underlying debt for the sole purpose of attempting to 
collect on that debt, that was an affirmative action 
that effectively waived sovereign immunity. Even though 
it is admitted that the SBA transferred the debt, they 
were still responsible for the apparent “deficiency” and 
the initiation of the transfer. As such, even the SBA 
was not the primary party to begin the debt collection 
process, it was still their actions that permitted it 
to proceed. As such, they can be sued for their actions 
that left to the collection action, even if they were 
not directly the party doing so. Specifically, the SBA 
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I. CONCLUSION
